Seventh Annual Southwest Economic Theory (SWET) Conference
          Saturday, March 12 — Sunday, March 13, 2005
          University of California, Riverside

Sponsors: UCR Graduate Division, Office of Research, Department of Economics, and College of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences.

Featured Speakers: In addition to 13 presentations of submitted papers, the program includes invited presentations by

• Bernard Cornet, Oswald Distinguished Professor of Microeconomics, University of Kansas (Professor at Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne until July 2004) and
• Eric Maskin, Albert O. Hirschman Professor of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton University.

Directions: Sessions take place in Humanities 1500 on the U. C. Riverside campus. Click here for directions. Directions to the Mission Inn (the conference hotel) can be found at http://www.missioninn.com.

Questions?  Contact any of the co-organizers, Jang-Ting Guo (guojt@ucr.edu), Wei Li (wei.li@ucr.edu), or R. Robert Russell (rcubed@ucr.edu).

Conference Schedule. Sessions will take place in Humanities 1500 on the U. C. Riverside campus.  Click on titles listed in blue to download pdf’s of papers.

Saturday, March 12
	8:30 – 8:50	Registration and Coffee
	8:50 – 9:50	Invited Lecture: Bernard Cornet (Kansas) Existence of Equilibria for Economies with Externalities and a Measure Space of Consumers
	9:50 – 10:30	Hugo Hopenhayn (UCLA) Trading Favors: Optimal Exchange and Forgiveness
	10:30 – 10:45	Coffee Break
	10:45 – 11:25	Garrett Asay (UCI) Why Negative Campaigning? The Chaotic Dynamics of an Election
	11:25 – 12:05	Michael McBride (UCI) Conjectural Pairwise Stability: Why Observation Matters in Mutual Consent Networks
	12:05 – 1:00	Lunch
	1:00 – 1:40	Sean Crockett (Cal. Tech.) A Simple Decentralized Institution for Learning Competitive Equilibrium
	1:40 – 2:20	Marc Muendler (UCSD) The Existence of Informationally Efficient Markets When Individuals Are Rational
	2:20 – 2:30	Coffee Break
	2:30 – 3:10	David Miller (UCSD) Attainable Payoffs in Repeated Games with Interdependent Private Information
	3:10 – 3:50	Wei Li (UCR) Drive and Talent
	3:50 – 4:30	Navin Kartik (UCSD) Information Transmission with Cheap and Almost-Cheap Talk
	4:30 – 4:40	Coffee Break
	4:40 – 5:20	Rod Garratt (UCSB) Bank Runs: An Experimental Study
	5:20 – 6:00	Mark Johnson (ASU) Algebraic Complexity of Strategy-Implementing Semiautomata for Repeated-Play Games
Sunday, March 13
	8:30 – 9:00	Coffee
	9:00 – 10:00	Invited Lecture: Eric Maskin (Princeton) Bargaining, Coalitions and Externalities
	10:00 – 10:40	Harrison Cheng (USC) Ranking Sealed High-Bid and Open Asymmetric Auctions
	10:40 – 10:55	Coffee Break
	10:55 – 11:35	Isabelle Brocas (USC) Auctions with Type-Dependent and Negative Externalities: the Optimal Mechanism
	11:35 – 12:15	Vasiliki Skreta (UCLA) Optimal Auction Design for Multiple Objects with Externalities